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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ENID COSGEIFF MUKPHY, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
MICHAEL EDWAKD MUKPHY, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for divorce. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Respondent was awarded a decree of divorce, re-
storing her former married name, confirming her own-
ership of assets acquired before this marriage or by in-
heritance or devise afterwards, directing return of a 
promissory note she held from appellant and rejecting 
appellant's belated claim that respondent should share 
in losses purportedly sustained by appellant because of 
this marriage. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The parties will hereinafter be designated as they 
appeared in the trial court. 
Case No. 
13748 
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,, The statement of facts in defendant's brief is not 
accepted by plaintiff and should not be favorably con-
sidered by this court since it is essentially limited to 
facts defendant emphasized on trial to support his claim 
for contribution but ignores or minimizes the effect of 
facts tending to support the findings and decree by the 
trial court. 
Thus, the statement of facts does violence to the 
long-standing principle that in divorce cases, the Su-
preme Court will "assume that the trial court believed 
the evidence which supports the findings'' and "will re-
view the whole evidence in the light most favorable to 
them;. . . " Stone v. Stone (1967) 19 Utah 2d 378, 431 P. 
2d. 802. 
Plaintiff therefore presents, in the following state-
ment of facts, the evidence the trial court reasonably 
could have believed in reaching its decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This marriage in 1964 was the defendant's first. 
He was then 46 and plaintiff was 52. They had no chil-
ren (E. 1,244). Previously, plaintiff had been married 
for 24 years to "Walter E. Cosgriff, President of Con-
tinental Bank & Trust Company in Salt Lake City, 
which marriage terminated in 1961 with Mr. Cosgriff's 
death in an automobile crash (R. 98). 
By her complaint, the plaintiff asked for a divorce 
and restoration of her former married name. In para-
graph 5 of her complaint, plaintiff alleged that neither 
2 
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she nor the defendant was dependent upon the other 
for financial support, since defendant was a physician 
in private practice and plaintiff had independent finan-
cial means. Plaintiff therefore waived any right to al-
imony. Plaintiff also alleged that the rights of the 
parties to such property as had been acquired by them 
during the marriage were being adjusted between them 
and thus, she did not ask the court for assistance on that 
subject (B. 1,2). 
By his answer and counterclaim, defendant denied 
the allegations of paragraph 5 and alleged instead that 
the parties were the owners of assets which he estimated 
had a value "in excess of three million dollars". He de-
manded judgment against the plaintiff allocating 
$300,000.00 to himself and requiring payment of more 
than $37,000.00 in obligations owed on his Minnesota 
farm properties (B. 5,6). 
In a proceeding prior to trial, the trial court or-
dered, on April 18, 1974, that counsel for the respective 
parties were to prepare and file with the court by April 
29, 1974, a statement of the assets of the respective 
parties and the assets, if any, of the marital estate, to-
gether with a j^roposed plan of distribution of such as-
sets in the event the court should grant a decree of di-
vorce (B, 38,39). Plaintiff's statement, dated April 29, 
1974 listed her assets as of April 17, 1974 as consisting 
of cash, bank stocks and miscellaneous items of a total 
value of $1,528,522.18. As shown by the statement, and 
as conceded upon trial, (B. 111,155) these assets were 
given to plaintiff by her late husband Walter E. Cos-
3 
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griff or were received by her prior to the marriage here-
in upon the distribution of the estate of J. E. Cosgriff 
or were received by her upon distribution of estates of 
other members of the Cosgriff family which estates were 
in the process of probate at the time of the marriage 
to the defendant (R. 56 to 60). 
Plaintiff proposed that the court confirm her as 
the owner of those listed assets since all had been ac-
quired from her former husband or from the estates of 
various members of the Cosgriff family and none of 
the assets had been acquired from or received from the 
defendant. Plaintiff also proposed that any sums the 
defendant had obtained from the sale of his Minnesota 
farm properties and equipment be confirmed as proper-
ty of the defendant and she also offered to return to the 
defendant, without payment, a note for $22,500.00 which 
note had been carried by her on her statement of assets 
without value (R. 58,59, 60). 
The statement submitted by the defendant did not 
show the value of assets at or near the time of trial. 
Instead, there was submitted an exhibit purporting to 
show the defendant's net worth immediately prior to 
the marriage and the value of assets he owned as of a 
date more than 14 months prior to trial. This exhibit, 
together with others, purported to demonstrate that de-
fendant had experienced a decrease in net worth during 
and because of the marriage totalling $133,990.00 and 
he proposed that the court require the plaintiff to pay 
to defendant an amount equal toi one-half of that loss or 
$66,995.00 (R. 46-55). Defendant makes the same claim 
in this court as shown by his brief at pages 19 and 20. 
4 
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Defendant is a physician who received training at 
the Mayo Clinic in his specialty of internal medicine. 
At the time of trial he was in good health and practic-
ing his specialty in Las Vegas, Nevada. Hei claimed he 
did not know what his income had been from his prac-
tice in previous years because he had not received fig-
ures from his accountants since December 1972. When 
pressed to give the court at least an estimate of his in-
come from the practice of medicine, he snapped " I 'm 
not an economist. I'm a physician." Since he had only 
been in Las Vegas about one year, he stated it was pre-
mature to determine if he was making the kind of in-
come he had hoped to make when he moved to Las Veg-
as but he finally estimated his income at about $40,000.00 
taxable income per year (R. 151 to 53). 
Upon trial, defendant repudiated that portion of his 
counterclaim in which he demanded a $300,000.00 award 
and he specifically disclaimed any right to share in the 
assets plaintiff had acquired from her former husband 
or from the estates of the Cosgriff family (R. 142, 155). 
In lieu of the demand in the counterclaim, defen-
dant urged the court to order the plaintiff to contribute 
to a loss which defendant had purportedly sustained by 
reason of the marriage totalling $133,990.00. That claim 
is repeated in this court. The manner in which the claim 
was computed may be determined by examining the fi-
nancial exhibit (R. 50) submitted to the court prior to 
trial. That exhibit shows defendant contends that he 
sustained a loss in the sale of various real and personal 
properties and in the sale of his Salt Lake City medical 
practice. 
5 
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However, it soon developed on cross-examination 
that each item of property listed on the exhibit had been 
sold by the defendant of his own volition and he had re-
ceived the proceeds of each sale and applied them to his 
own needs and purposes. During a previous separation 
of the parties in 1968, defendant sold the Brighton cot-
tage at a price much less than its value and he listed 
and sold the home on Fortuna Way in Salt Lake City 
for $53,000.00, a price offered by a willing buyer. De-
endant agreed he received and used the proceeds from 
these sales (R. 252,253). 
After the parties reconciled in late 1968, defendant 
sold two of his three automobiles and his medical prac-
tice because he needed money to pay the farm bills which 
had been incurred in the operation of the farm he had 
acquired before this marriage and which he had begun 
to operate ;just prior to the marriage (R. 248, 253, 254). 
The largest single item of loss claimed by the de-
fendant on his exhibit (R, 50) is the total of $113,600.00 
purportedly lost by him because of a sale of the farm 
property in Minnesota. However, on cross-examination 
the defendant admitted that he made the sale of that 
property in late March 1973, about ten months after the 
parties finally separated and that he felt compelled to 
sell because he had experienced adverse weather con-
ditions the previous year and when he applied for fed-
eral loan assistance for the coming year, he learned that 
the President had impounded such loan funds and thus 
he did not believe he could operate the farm through 
another year without financial assistance. He sold the 
6 
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entire farm including all equipment, buildings and live-
stock to a land speculator for an amount which he con-
ceded was substantially less than he could have obtained 
in other circumstances and at no time did he either in-
form the plaintiff, consult with her about the wisdom of 
the sale or offer to account to her for the proceds of the 
sale after it had been completed (R. 158, 159, 160). 
Cross-examination also revealed that in each of the 
eight years in which defendant filed his Federal Income 
Tax Return as a married1 man filing separately, he had 
shown substantial farm operation losses which exceeded 
his medical practice income; thus he paid no income tax, 
did not share any of the farm proceeds with the plain-
tiff and did not ask her to share the losses (R. 251). 
Defendant also conceded that during the course of 
this marriage, the plaintiff had made gifts to the defen-
dant of cash or property of the total value of $68,994.00 
(R.268). 
Much of the foregoing evidence concerning the loss 
defendant claimed to have suffered by reason of this 
marriage wras received over the vigorous and continued 
objection of plaintiff. One of the grounds of the objec-
tion was that defendant did not seek this relief in his 
counterclaim and therefore the proof and the theory 
were outside the issues presented by the pleadings (R. 
196). Defendant moved the court for its order permit-
ting him to amend the counterclaim but the court denied 
the motion "at this time" and thereafter heard much 
of the evidence just described (R. 197 et seq.). After 
7 
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hearing all of the evidence, the court again heard argu-
ment on the subject and then, by minute entry of May 6, 
1974, the motion to amend was denied (R. 44). 
As is frequently true in a divorce case, there was 
conflicting evidence concerning the mental cruelty which 
plaintiff had alleged in her complaint. Plaintiff testi-
fied, and the court apparently believed, that defendant 
had been vocally critical of her personality, her appear-
ance, her friendships and almost every other aspect of 
her make up (R. 98). Plaintiff was and is a devout Cath-
olic and attended mass daily and thus, defendant's de-
rogatory remarks about Catholic clergy and lay mem-
bers of the Catholic order offended her deeply (R. 99) 
and defendant characterized her belief that Jesus Christ 
is the son of God as "garbage" which she viewed as 
blasphemy (R, 100,199). 
Defendant increased his criticism after the parties 
moved to Minnesota to the point that plaintiff testified 
his faultfinding, criticism and arrogance became even 
more frequent and when she remonstrated with him, he 
would refuse to speak to her for days at a time and all 
of this conduct, according to plaintiff's testimony, made 
her constantly upset and nervous and caused her to en-
dure insomnia for several weeks at a time (R. 98, 103, 
107). 
Defendant, upon cross-examination, agreed that he 
and the plaintiff had had marked differences of opinion 
on a great many subjects and he conceded that a contin-
uation of the marriage would be intolerable (R. 245, 246). 
8 
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Based upon all of the foregoing evidence, the trial 
court made its findings, reached its conclusions of law 
and entered a decree awarding plaintiff an interlocutory-
decree of divorce, confirming her ownership of the as-
sets she had acquired outside of the marriage, confirm-
ing defendant's ownership of the proceeds of the sales 
of his property, restoring plaintiff's former married 
name, awarding no alimony or costs and directing that 
plaintiff return to defendant, without payment, a note 
signed by the defendant and in favor of the plaintiff for 
$22,500.00. Plaintiff promptly returned the note (B. 78) 
and after defendant's motion to amend the findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and decree of divorce was de-
nied by the court (E. 80, 81, 82) this appeal followed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM FOE CONTRIBU-
TION WAS NEITHEE TIMELY NOE SUP-
POETED BY THE EVIDENCE AND THE 
TEIAL COURT PEOPEELY EEJECTED IT. 
In his counterclaim dated and filed February 28, 
1973, defendant alleged that both parties had contrib-
uted to the accumulation and preservation of substantial 
assets which were estimated by defendant to have a 
value of more than three million dollars. Of that total 
sum, defendant alleged that there were "cash and other 
liquid assets estimated in the amount of $1,900,000.00" 
in Utah, Nevada, Montana and Idaho and of that sum, 
he asked that the court award him $300,000.00 (E. 4, 5). 
9 
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He made no claim that the marriage had resulted 
in a decrease in his net worth nor did he claim that the 
marriage had resulted in a loss to him which plaintiff 
should be required to share. 
In her reply to the counterclaim, plaintiff denied 
that the parties owned substantial assets and affirma-
tively alleged that the assets she owned were not part 
of any marital estate and she denied that defendant had 
made any contribution of substance "to such marital es-
tate as may be found to exist" (R. 10,11). 
Defendant made no attempt to amend his plead-
ings or to change the issues framed by the pleadings un-
til the case came on for trial more than a year later. 
However, upon trial defendant never offered any evi-
dence to support his claim that there was a substantial 
marital estate or that he had made contributions to it. 
Instead, shortly after the trial began, defendant con-
ceded that he did not claim any right to the assets which 
plaintiff had acquired from her former husband or from 
the estates of members of the family and it was also 
conceded at that same time that defendant no longer 
denied plaintiff's allegation that each of the parties was 
self-supporting and neither required support from the 
other (R. 155). 
By these concessions, defendant effectively de-
stroyed the basis of the allegations in his counterclaim 
concerning the financial relationship of these parties. 
He then began his attempt to establish a new and dif-
ferent claim to the effect that during the marriage he 
10 
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had sustained a decrease in his net worth resulting in 
a loss of $133,990.00 which plaintiff should share by a 
contribution of one-half of the loss or $66,995.00 (E. 46-
55,156). 
Plaintiff objected to evidence offered in support of 
this new claim and the objection was at first sustained 
(E. 145) but after the weekend recess, during which the 
court presumably reflected upon the matter, the court 
stated that plaintiff's continuing objection would be rec-
ognized but that defendant would be permitted neverthe-
less to proceed (E. 193). 
Defendant therefore proceeded to testify concern-
ing each of the properties and assets which may be 
found listed on his financial exhibit submitted to the 
court before trial (E. 50) and attempted to show that 
as to each of the enumerated assets, a loss had been sus-
tained, reaching the total of more than $133,000.00 (E. 
193etseq.). 
Defendant offered testimony concerning the value 
and disposition of each of the assets which form the fi-
nancial exhibit (E. 50) and he contended in the trial 
court, and reiterates here in the first three points in his 
brief, that the items of personal and real property shown 
on the exhibit each had a specific financial value and 
each had been totally lost as a result of this marriage. 
Defendant's contention ignores a basis principle of evi-
dence that " testimony of a witness on his direct exam-
ination is no stronger than as modified or left by his 
further examination or by his cross-examination." Al-
ii 
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varado v. Tucker (1954) 2 Utah 2d 16, 268 P. 2d 986. 
In the light of that principle, the following paragraph-
by-paragraph summary will describe each of these items 
of real and personal property and show what happened 
to it: 
FORTUNA WAY HOUSE 
Defendant sold this house in 1968, during a pre-
vious brief separation of these parties, for $53,000.00 
which was the price a willing buyer agreed to pay after 
the property had been listed with a realtor. After pay-
ment of mortgages, selling commission and closing costs, 
defendant received $13,000.00 which he testified he 
needed to pay farm bills for the Minnesota farm prop-
erty he had inherited in 1963 and which he had begun to 
operate as a farm just prior to this marriage (R. 209, 
248,252). 
BRIGHTON CANYON COTTAGE 
This property is listed on the financial exhibit at 
a value of $20,000.00 but defendant admitted he made 
the decision to sell that cottage, prior to the former 
temporary separation of the parties, and had in fact 
sold it for $8,000.00 which he then knew was not a rea-
sonable price because he recognized the sale was made 
at far less than market value. The proceeds of that 
sale were kept and used by him. (R. 252). 
MINNESOTA FARM AND EQUIPMENT 
Defendant claimed in his financial exhibit that the 
Minnesota farm and its equipment had a value of 
12 
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$113,600.00 immediately prior to this marriage. The 
farm, known as the Murphy farm, had been inherited 
by him in 1963 and he had "just barely begun" to oper-
ate the farm shortly before these parties were married. 
Thereafter, an adjoining farm, known as the Sullivan 
farm, was purchased under a real estate contract with 
the financial assistance of the plaintiff. As parti of the 
arrangements for reconciliation following the 1968 sep-
aration of these parties, defendant gave plaintiff a re-
lease of any obligation she might owe on the Sullivan 
farm (Ex. 22P) and thereafter improvements of the 
buildings on the two farms were made and additional 
equipment and stock were acquired. Defendant decided 
to move to Minnesota to be closer to the farm ojDeration 
in 1969 and he operated the farm as his sole enterprise 
and never as a joint enterprise with plaintiff. During 
eight of the taxable years these parties were married, 
defendant reported his farm income on his own income 
tax returns, utilizing claimed losses from the farm op-
eration as deductions against his medical practice in-
come and never once claimed plaintiff was a part of the 
farm operation. Finally, after a disastrous farm year 
because of high water and other problems in 1972, de-
fendant applied for federal loan assistance, intending 
to continue farming in 1973 but when the President im-
pounded funds for such loans, defendant sold the entire 
farm acreage, all of its buildings and their furnishings, 
all of the farm equipment including granaries, feeders 
and silos, plus all livestock to a speculator for a total 
price of $280,000.00, which defendant conceded was con-
siderably less than he could have obtained if he had 
13 
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sold the properties to someone other than a speculator. 
Defendant did not inform plaintiff of the sale nor ac-
count to her afterwards for any of its proceeds (K. 156, 
157,160,251,258,259,260). 
AUTOMOBILES 
Defendant's exhibit (E, 50) listed three automobiles, 
two of which he had as of the beginning of the marriage 
and one which was acquired afterwards. The latter auto-
mobile was still in defendant's possession at the time 
of trial. The first two automobiles, having a value de-
fendant claimed of $6,500.00, were sold by him for an 
amount he did not disclose but, in any event, he took 
the money from the sales of those cars and applied it in 
payment of bills he had incurred on the farm (E. 253, 
254). 
MEDICAL PRACTICE 
Defendant's exhibit showed he valued his former 
medical practice in Salt Lake City at $15,000.00, con-
sisting of $10,000.00 in accounts receivable and $5,000.00 
in equipment and goodwill. At the time of the marriage, 
defendant had just begun to operate the farm he in-
herited in Minnesota and he apparently intended to con-
tinue his medical practice in Salt Lake City and to visit 
the farm only periodically to oversee the activities of 
someone hired to run the farm (E, 248). However, in 
1968, he decided it was necessary that he live closer to 
the farm and he made the decision to move to Minnesota 
in 1969. He testified that he knew he would be taking 
a "big financial loss" in his medical practice but "I felt 
14 
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I could somehow compensate for it by being there close 
to the farm and running them (sic) more economically" 
(R. 270). He sold his medical practice in Salt Lake City 
to Dr. Ron Ward who thereafter paid him for the prac-
tice with regular payments over a period of time. The 
purchaser collected some of the accounts receivable and 
sent the proceeds to the defendant and the remainder 
of the accounts were collected by the Continental Bank 
which forwarded the collected amounts to him (R. 249, 
250). Thus, it was demonstrated conclusively that the 
sale of the medical practice resulted from defendant's 
own decision to move to Minnesota and that all of the 
money from that sale was received by the defendant. 
There was, therefore, no basis for defendant's claim that 
plaintiff's conduct had forced him to lose the entire 
value of the medical practice and that plaintiff should 
help regain that loss by a contribution of one-half. 
COUNTRY CLUB MEMBERSHIP AND 
SECURITIES 
Defendant had received the country club member-
ship as a gift from the plaintiff and he admitted he had 
sold it for his own purposes although the amount he 
received was not disclosed (R. 254). There was never 
any testimony concerning the nature of the securities 
defendant allegedly had owned and later lost and thus 
the only evidence concerning the assets listed on the 
final portion of his financial exhibit (R. 50) showed he 
had converted the assets to his own use. 
Although defendant contends the trial court erred 
in not permitting him to amend his counterclaim to 
15 
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claim contribution from the plaintiff, it is clear from 
the record that defendant was not prejudiced by that 
ruling because defendant was permitted to introduce 
the evidence concerning that theory and this record con-
clusively demonstrates that the evidence simply failed 
to establish the claim so that the court was amply jus-
tified in rejecting it. 
Defendant also claims the trial court erred in re-
jecting evidence concerning what defendant might have 
done with his assets and what his financial position 
might have been if he had not married the plaintiff (R. 
230 et seq.). The following excerpt from the transcript 
illustrates the nature of the proof which was offered 
and rejected: 
Q. (By Mr. McMurray) Now, Dr. Murphy, if 
you had not married Enid Cosgriff, can you 
state with reasonable certainty whether or 
not you would have continued your medical 
practice here in Salt Lake City! 
Mr. Snow: Objection. Objected to as imma-
terial and irrelevant. They did get married, 
and he was a grown man at the time. 
The Court: Sustained. 
Q. (By Mr. McMurray) Dr. Murphy, can you 
state with reasonable certainty if it hadn't 
have been for your marriage to Enid Cos-
griff whether or not you would still be own-
ing the basic acreage which you inherited in 
Minnesota, the 312 acres, the Brighton prop-
erty that you have described, the cottage, the 
canyon property, and the house on Fortuna 
Wavf 
16 
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Mr. Snow: Objection. Objected to, your 
Honor, for the reasons previously stated and 
also because it's pure speculation. It is to-
tally irrelevant and immaterial to the issues 
in this ease. 
The Court: Sustained. (R. 239, 
These parties had been married ten years at the 
time of the trial. The proffered evidence, seeking to 
elicit what might have occurred during that ten year 
period but for the marriage, constituted pure and un-
bridled speculation and could have furnished no proper 
basis for the court to make any finding concerning an 
alleged loss. 
The evidence offered by the defendant appeared to 
represent an attempt by him to claim that the court 
should ignore the fact that these parties were properly 
married in 1964 and had continued to live as man and 
wife at least the next nine years. Defendant accepted 
such benefits as were provided by the marriage but 
would have had the court ignore the fact and attempt 
to treat the rights of the parties as if the marriage had 
never occurred. Defendant, having participated in the 
marriage ceremony and in the married life that followed 
and, by his counterclaim, having sought to terminate 
the marriage by a divorce, may not now properly ask to 
be restored to the condition in which he found himself 
prior to the marriage. 
Neither in the trial court nor in his brief in this 
court does defendant cite any authority which would 
lend even remote support to the theory he has advanced 
17 
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and this is, perhaps, for the very good reason there is 
no legal precedent for his position. 
In the first three points of his brief, dealing with 
his claim for contribution, defendant pleads for "equit-
able treatment" and it is thus ironic to note that his fi-
nancial exhibits completely ignore the substantial finan-
cial contributions which, as his testimony reveals, plain-
tiff had made to him or to his various properties. The rec-
ord shows that plaintiff gave him $15,000.00 for the 
down payment on the Sullivan farm purchase contract 
(R. 202, 203), paid $6,500.00 for remodeling the Sulli-
van farm home (R. 210), purchased an adjacent wood-
lot (R. 209) and paid for the remodeling of the main 
farmhouse (R. 210, 212). Prior to the departure for 
Minnesota, plaintiff had made substantial contributions 
to the improvement of the Brighton cottage (R. 194) 
and it is a reasonable inference from the evidence that 
she made other substantial and continuing contributions 
to the payment of the living expenses of these parties 
because defendant admitted, and his exhibits reveal, that 
all of the earnings from his medical practice in Minne-
sota went into the farm (Ex. 20-D, R. 244). Aside from 
payment of daily living expenses, plaintiff's contribu-
tions formed part of her gifts to the defendant of more 
than $68,000.00 since 1967, which gifts defendant reluc-
tantly conceded he had received (R. 268). 
Defendant seeks equity but he is not willing to be-
stow it. The trial court properly exercised its discre-
tion in rejecting his assorted claims for contribution and 
its action should be affirmed and endorsed by this court. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN AWARDING THE DE-
CREE OF DIVORCE TO PLAINTIFF. 
Although defendant contends the evidence respect-
ing the grounds for divorce preponderated in his favor, 
he has demonstrated no compelling reason why the trial 
court should have granted the divorce to him, instead 
of to the plaintiff. He does not contend, in his brief in 
this court, that no divorce should have been granted at 
all and he appears to concede, as he did in the trial 
court, that this marriage is beyond salvation. 
As is clearly shown in plaintiff's statement of facts, 
found earlier in this brief, plaintiff's testimony pro-
vided ample grounds for the court to conclude a divorce 
was required and to award it to plaintiff. Even if the 
trial court had also found that defendant had produced 
grounds for divorce, the ultimate result would have been 
for the court to order a dissolution of this marriage be-
cause, in either event, the evidence would have shown 
clearly that this marriage is at an end. 
As this court observed in its 1971 decision in Mullins 
v. Mullins 26 Utah 2d, 485 P.2d 663: 
When a divorce is granted to one, both of the 
spouses effectively are divorced. There seems 
to be nothing in our statute or in logic that would 
prevent a dissolution of the marriage by grant-
ing a divorce to both, where the facts fault each 
equally as respect to grounds therefor — if such 
procedure would make anybody happy. Whether 
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one or the other or both should be given a di-
vorce should be left to the sound discretion of the 
trial court based on the evidence adduced. 
Defendant has suggested no reason why this court 
should substitute its judgment for the studied determin-
ation by the trial court that plaintiff should be awarded 
a divorce. This court has frequently observed that the 
trial court is in an "advantaged position" because it ob-
serves the witnesses as they testify and is thus in a po-
sition to judge the credibility of the witnesses and the 
extent to which their testimony should be believed. Stone 
v. Stone supra; Searle v. Searle (1974) — Utah 2d — 
522 P.2d 697 and cases therein cited. 
The Searle case also repeats the long-standing rule 
on appeal in this court that "the burden is upon appel-
lant to prove such a serious inequity as to manifest a 
clear abuse of discretion". The defendant, in his claim 
that the decree should have been awarded to him or to 
both of the parties, has failed to carry that burden in 
this court. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant, by his counterclaim, alleged that the 
"parties are owners of substantial assets" which were 
estimated to be of a value in excess of $3,000,000.00, of 
which defendant demanded $300,000.00 as his share. As 
the trial neared and it became apparent there was no 
such marital estate, defendant abandoned his counter-
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claim demand and conceded that he had no right to share 
in the assets plaintiff had received by gift before mar-
riage or by inheritance or devi se afterward. 
Developments upon trial proved that defendant's 
concession was more illusory than real. While disclaim-
ing any right to plaintiff's assets, defendant sought to 
obtain a sizeable portion of them by the belated claim 
that plaintiff should share in losses allegedly sustained 
by the defendant because of the marriage and because 
of plaintiff's "enthusiasm and encouragement" (R. 142) 
as defendant expanded his farm operation. When the 
evidence revealed the defendant operated the farm as 
his own, taking such income benefits as it produced and 
claiming such tax credits as its losses permitted, defen-
dant then attempted to support a claim by offering evi-
dence concerning what his financial condition might have 
been if he had not entered into this marriage ten years 
earlier. 
The trial court saw this for what it was — a plain 
attempt to gain indirectly that which the law and the 
facts would not permit him to gain directly. Defendant 
is a medical doctor without obligations of any kind and 
he is presently earning $40,000.00 a year and obviously 
will make more as he becomes better known in his com-
munity. Although defendant's brief would leave the im-
pression that he is without assets, he volunteered to the 
trial court (R. 176) that if a doctor earns $50,000.00 a 
year "that's the equivalent of having a million dollars 
in assets, I guess, the current return rates." 
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Under these facts and upon this record, the trial 
court's action was eminently fair and correct and it 
should be sustained by this court. 
Respectfully submitted, ' 
JOHN H. SNOW 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
7th Floor, Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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